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Third party retaliation gets SCOTUS review

Retaliation against an employee who complains about discrimination is unlawful. But when a female complains about discrimination and the subsequent adverse action alleged is taken against her husband or boyfriend is the victim of a third party reprisal protected? The Fifth Circuit has long held no, they are not. On the last day of the Term, the Supreme Court granted Cert. in Thompson v. North American Stainless LP, No. 09-291. Thompson was fired after his fiancee complained about discrimination. More after the jump.
A panel of the 6th Circuit overturned a grant of summary judgment (2-1), a fractured en banc opinion reinstated the summary judgment. The issues presented in the Cert. petition are

(1) Does section 704(a) forbid an employer 
from retaliating for such activity by inflicting 
reprisals on a third party, such as a spouse, 
family member or fiancĂ©, closely associated 
with the employee who engaged in such 
protected activity? 
(2) If so, may that prohibition be enforced 
in a civil action brought by the third party 
victim? 

Third Party retaliation claims under Title VII approved by Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has decided an important retaliation case, and again has broadly construed Title VII's protections against retaliation. In Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, No. 09-291 the employee claimed he was fired because his fiancee had filed a sex discrimination charge against their common employer. More after the jump.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer holding Title VII “does not permit third party retaliation claims.” An en banc Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia reiterated the basis for an expansive interpretation of the anti-retaliation provisions relying in substantial part upon the text of Title VII's retaliation provision.
"[W]e adopted a broad standard in Burlington because Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is worded broadly. We think there is no textual basis for making an exception to it for third-party reprisals, and a preference for clear rules [the employer's argument] cannot justify departing from statutory text."
But Justice Scalia rejects the concept that anyone with Article III standing should be permitted to sue for a Title VII violation. He adopts the "zone of interests" test.
"[A] plaintiff may not sue unless he “falls within the ‘zone of interests’ sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint.” Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871, 883 (1990). We have described the “zone of interests” test as denying a right of review “if the plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or in  consistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388, 399–400 (1987). We hold that the term “ag  grieved” in Title VII incorporates this test, enabling suit by any plaintiff with an interest “arguably [sought] to be protected by the statutes,” National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 522 U. S. 479, 495 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), while excluding plain  tiffs who might technically be injured in an Article III sense but whose interests are unrelated to the statutory prohibitions in Title VII."

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